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Introduction  
 British official documents in the immediate post-WWI period repeatedly invoke 
divisions in Egyptian society as a strategy to justify their occupation of the country since 
1882 and to ensure ongoing access to its resources in an era of increasing international 
attention to self-determination. The proclamation of a British protectorate at the onset of 
World War I in 1914 led to a period of unrest in Egypt, culminating in the 1919 revolution. 
The British government responded to the revolution by sending a Special Mission to Egypt 
in 1921 to investigate the cause of the uprising. The Report of the Special Mission and 
related British official documents dating from the aftermath of the 1919 revolution present 
Egyptian society as essentially divided, recalcitrant, and backward. It was important for the 
British to position themselves as the superior power to protect both their international 
reputation and their strategic interests in Egypt. Thus, they presented divisions amongst 
the fellahin (peasants), women, and students in Egypt as “natural” and any common cause 
between them in the service of national liberation as an ephemeral product of “agitators” 
and “extremists.” It was beneficial for the British to divide these three sectors of society to 
appear as though Egypt was not – could not be - united against them. This was part of a 
complex colonial plan to make Egypt appear orderly and under control within the 
framework of post-WWI British Empire.  
The central project of this thesis is to address the manner in which and extent to 
which social divisions appear in sources preserved in the British National Archives. While 
divide and rule tactics are well-known to historians of British empire, the frequency with 
which the fellahin, women, and students are invoked in these documents suggests that they 
were the most important and useful social categories to the British occupation of Egypt. In 
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other words, these three categories emerge from the sources themselves and distinguish 
the Egyptian case. Thus, I ask how and why the British emphasized the fellahin, women, 
and students in official documents following the 1919 revolution. Scholarship has largely 
recognized the challenges the British faced in protecting their interests in Egypt after 
World War I, yet the way in which the British insisted upon the incompatibility between 
the fellahin, women, and students in the 1919 revolution has been underestimated as a 
strategy for ensuring their continued presence in the country. The pattern, weight, and 
repetition of these categories in the sources indicates that the production of these divisions 
was part of a discourse of justification and a plan for ongoing British control that 
transcends any individual. The images that appear in British official documents and the 
Report of the Special Mission to Egypt were repeated to such an extent that they took on a 
life of their own.  
The first chapter assesses the British perception of the fellahin population, who 
were portrayed as isolated from Egyptian nationalist unrest in the cities and blissfully 
content with the British occupation until the 1919 revolution. The mobilization of the 
fellahin in the revolution received considerable attention because the British had 
characterized the fellahin as supporters of the occupation.1 In Workers and Peasants in the 
Modern Middle East, Joel Benin states that “during the war peasants evaded the demands of 
the British rulers to the extent they could – a common ‘weapon of the weak.’”2 Since this 
kind of resistance was often invisible, it was easy for British officials to interpret them as – 
                                                      
1 Edmund Allenby, Allenby in Palestine: The Middle East Correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount 
Allenby, June 1917-October 1919, ed. Matthew Hughes (Stoud: Published by Sutton for the Army 
Records Society, 2004). 
2 Joel Beinin, The Contemporary Middle East: Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 87. 
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or to make them appear – content with conditions in the country. Any visible discontent 
was quickly written off by the British as a result of abuse of power by the Egyptian officials 
(known by the title of “Omdeh”) the British employed to administer the provinces. In other 
words, for the British it was not wartime policies, but the manner in which they were 
carried out by corrupt Egyptian bureaucrats that led the fellahin to lose confidence in the 
British and join the 1919 revolution. This claim was convenient and beneficial to 
preserving their position in Egypt. The British used the Omdeh as a scapegoat and depicted 
this to be the target of fellahin resistance, not the occupation itself.  
 Historiography of the British occupation points to a much longer history of 
opposition among the fellahin than British official documents from the period portray. 
Scholars’ emphasis on the fellahin’s participation in the revolution indicates that Egypt was  
in fact much more unified than the British were prepared to recognize. It becomes evident 
that it was part of their divide and conquer strategy to present the fellahin to be exploited 
and brainwashed by other sectors of Egyptian society and the revolution as their very first 
act of defiance. In the Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914, Robert 
Tignor states that “the British used [fellahin] isolation and their separation from the 
Egyptian population to enhance their image of moral and physical superiority over the 
Egyptians.”3 In The History of Egypt, P.J. Vatikiotis explains, “it was perhaps natural for the 
rural population to explode in the manner they did.”4  While the British professed surprise 
at the peasants’ role in the revolution and portrayed the apparent unity of the Egyptian 
population as unnatural and ephemeral, other observers saw it as a major blow to 
                                                      
3 Robert Tignor, Modernization and British colonial rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), 395. 
4 P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt. 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
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imperialism in the post-WWI era. In “Peasants in Revolt-Egypt 1919,” Ellis Goldberg argues 
that “contemporaries viewed [the revolution] as having international importance because 
it was the result of thirty years of European domination, and its resolution would be likely 
to affect all Western colonial empires.”5 British officials who wanted to stabilize and 
preserve their imperial privileges in this atmosphere had to work very hard to justify 
themselves to the rest of the world.  
The second chapter dissects the complexity of the position of Egyptian women 
amidst evolving imperialist and nationalist propaganda. Concurrent with the nationalist 
movement in Egypt, an international feminist movement was in full swing and greatly 
concerned with the status of “Eastern” women. Along with the fellahin, Egyptian women’s 
participation in the revolution revealed their discontent towards the British occupation. 
Their participation also made it explicitly obvious that Egypt was much more unified than 
the British professed. British official documents from this period were extremely defensive 
about the position of Egyptian women and painted them to be ignorant, unintelligent, and 
helpless to justify colonial rule. British officials constantly discussed reforms targeting 
women. In these documents, it was beneficial to highlight “new opportunities” for Egyptian 
women’s education since 1882, which implied that they had not existed before the British 
intervened. Yet according to Vatikiotis, “at the turn of the century 95 percent of Egyptians 
were illiterate, and until 1920 hardly more than 1 percent of the annual budget of Egyptian 
governments was ever devoted to education. Education during the British occupation had 
been neglected.”6 The British intentionally neglected education because they feared it 
                                                      
5 Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt — Egypt 1919," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24, 
no. 2 (1992): 261, http://www.jstor.org/stable/164298. 
6 Vatikiotis, 435. 
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would spread nationalism. In regard to women, they “reformed” their curriculum to teach 
domestic tasks, such as sewing and daily hygiene. Domestic reforms actually narrowed 
opportunities for women, while the British boasted that they were modernizing the 
country.  
Historians emphasize the importance of the Egyptian women’s participation in the 
1919 revolution because, yet again, it reveals a much longer history of Egyptian feminist 
activity. Beinin states in “Egypt: Society and Economy, 1923-1952” that “the participation 
of women in the street demonstrations during the 1919 nationalist uprising irrevocably 
endowed the women’s awakening with nationalist legitimacy.”7 In The Women’s Awakening 
in Egypt, Beth Baron argues: 
For the first time in Egyptian history, according to many accounts, women were 
thrust from the private realm onto the public stage. The revolution is thus often 
taken as the first expression of nationalist sentiment on the part of women, as well 
as the crucible of the women’s movement. Yet women’s participation in the events 
of 1919 were a continuation and extension of the activities of the previous decades.8 
 
Just as the British professed surprise that the fellahin revolted, the British had not expected 
the women to participate in the revolution because they intentionally implemented 
reforms to keep women isolated and uneducated. Conversely, British documents suggest 
that the British took credit for feminist activity and female education reforms. Yet 
historiography reveals that Egyptians were the ones to push for female education 
advancements during the occupation. For example, Leila Ahmed discloses that “in 1912 the 
nationalists opened community centers which offered lectures and cultural events which 
                                                      
7 Joel Beinin, “Egypt: Society and Economy, 1923-1952,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt, ed. by 
M.W. Daly (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 314.  
8 Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press, (London, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1994), 35. 
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women as well as men were encouraged to attend- and which women did attend.”9 It was 
beneficial for the British to ignore this type of activity in British official documents in order 
to take credit for any instance of feminist activity. British officials stressed the 
contributions of their presence by playing into this rhetoric, reiterating the constraints of 
the Islamic religion on women, and crediting themselves for Egyptian feminism. Similar to 
how the British blamed fellahin discontent after the 1919 revolution on the Omdeh the 
British argue that Egyptian women’s discontent after the 1919 revolution had to do with 
the inadequacies of Egyptian society. The British used the apparent low-status of Egyptian 
women to justify the need for colonial rule. Yet again, Britain strategically assigned blame 
onto Egyptians to defend the need for an ongoing colonial presence.  
The third chapter highlights the role Egyptian students played as the “lead 
agitators”10 in the 1919 revolution. While British official documents emphasize the 
unexpectedness of the fellahin’s and women’s participation in the revolution, they 
predicted unrest amongst Egyptian students. British official documents identify students as 
the leaders of the disturbances leading up to the revolution and divide them into two 
categories: students attending Al-Azhar, the premier religious institution of higher 
education in Egypt, and students in government run schools. Students and teachers of Al-
Azhar are depicted as the primary “agitators” and were blamed for feeding nationalist 
                                                      
9 Leila Ahmed, “Feminism and Feminist movements in the Middle East, a Preliminary Exploration: 
Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen,” Women’s Studies International 
Forum, Vol.5 (1982), 155-156. 
10 NA/FO 141/521/4, Letter, Ayerst Henham Hooker to Lord Allenby, Foreign Office Papers on Mr. 
Ayerst Henham Hooker’s views and reports on the Egyptian Situation 1919-1923. 
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propaganda to students in government schools through religious education. Similar to how 
the British attributed the fellahin’s unrest to the lack of British presence in the provinces, 
British official documents claim that student disturbances were a result of the lack of 
British teachers in government run schools. In their view, Egyptian students were led 
astray by the fanatical inclinations of their instructors and by the backwardness of their 
own parents.  Once again, it was not the occupation itself, but the inadequacies of the 
Egyptian population that were painted as the root causes of the revolution. This was a 
strategy for asserting the blamelessness of and ongoing need for British presence in the 
country.   
 The historiography reveals the complexity of unrest amongst students. They were 
not brainwashed by religious teachers, nor was their activism the result of an unsupervised 
upbringing. It was instead a product of domestic and international factors, which the 
British authorities deliberately downplayed. In The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian 
Nationalism, Jamal Mohammad Ahmed states that “the educated classes in Cairo and the 
provincial cities looked upon President Wilson’s declaration as the fulfilment of their 
dream.”11 President Wilson’s “14 Points” speech advocated for self-determination and gave 
Egyptians the hope that freedom from colonial rule was a feasible goal. In Egypt from 
Independence to Revolution 1919-1952, Selma Botman argues:  
what originated as a peaceful political proposal initiated by largely upper-class 
Egyptian notables, who were influenced by the speeches of President Woodrow 
Wilson of the United States defending national self-determination, turned into 
revolutionary activity carried out by the mass population.12  
 
                                                      
11 Jamal Muhammad Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism. Middle Eastern 
Monographs (London, New York: Oxford University press, 1960), 117. 
12 Selma Botman, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952, Contemporary Issues in the 
Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 29. 
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In the post-World War I context, President Wilson’s speech made it even more difficult for 
the British to make a case for ongoing colonialism. The British were aware of the influence 
of President Wilson’s speech on Egyptians, so British officials deliberately deflected 
attention away from the righteousness and capability of Egyptian nationalists to paint 
Egyptians as incapable of self-rule 
Analysis of British foreign office documents affirms the complexity of Britain’s 
position as an imperial power in Egypt at a time of increased international attention to 
questions of liberation and self-determination. The British strategically and consciously 
isolated the fellahin, students, and women from one another as part of their divide and rule 
tactic. Divisions were constantly produced, even within those three sectors of society, as a 
way to explain the nation’s unrest. Every statement, letter, or document produced in British 
official documents reveals how thoroughly invested in this social construct the British 
were.  Yet, the 1919 revolution forced British officials to contend with an overwhelming 
display of Egyptian unity. Thus, British official documents and the Report of the Special 
Mission to Egypt published after the 1919 revolution reveal how their divide and rule tactic 
failed in Egypt.  Nonetheless, they maintained that such unity was superficial, and the real 
enemies of the Egyptian people were their own corruption, religious fanaticism, and 
ignorance.  The only answer was continuing, if not increasing, British presence. In reality, 
the Egyptians were neither inherently disobedient, nor inferior to the British, despite these 
portrayals. It was simply beneficial to the British to perpetuate these stereotypes. British 
portrayals of Egyptian society sought to position the British Empire in new colonial, 
domestic, and international contexts in a way that would ensure its survival. In the 
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Egyptian context, it was part of Britain’s plan to maintain their position as Egypt’s 
protectorate.  
 The conclusions reached in each chapter rely on British official documents produced 
during or after the 1919 revolution and the Report of the Special Mission to Egypt. I 
traveled to the British National Archives in August 2017 and January 2018 to conduct my 
research. Upon my first trip, the sources I found were letters from British expatriates in 
Egypt written to Lord Allenby, the High Commissioner of Egypt. These series of letter 
addressed the cause of the unrest that led up to the 1919 revolution. Research during the 
second visit focused on specific reports produced by the foreign office about the fellahin, 
women, and students. These reports were commissioned by subcommittees of the Special 
Mission and published between 1920 and 1921. The purpose of the reports was to 
investigate the unrest and opposition to the protectorate, with the goal of bringing clarity 
to the overall situation. It becomes very clear that these reports were not actually 
concerned with Egyptian grievances but were a way of deflecting responsibility. Lastly, the 
Report of the Special Mission to Egypt was integral to my argument because it analyzed the 
situation in Egypt prior to WWI, during WWI, and after WWI, and offered a proposal from 
the Mission on how to best proceed in Egypt. The report was important because it 
recognized that Britain’s divide and rule tactic had failed, but maintained the assumptions 
that had driven and justified that tactic prior to 1919.  
In order to analyze what was being said about a specific social group, I examined 
how tropes relating to fellahin, students, and women were present across a series of 
documents. Focusing on each social group allowed me to recognize the patterns and 
repetition that were produced by the British. The extent to which these images reoccur 
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indicates that these divisions were produced by the British and that these three social 
categories were depicted to be the most important to the British. Furthermore, I looked at 
the sources in chronological order because of the distinct shift in Britain’s perception of 
social categories after the 1919 revolution. British officials were under scrutiny from 
Parliament, so they became defensive of their position and sought to deflect the blame. 
While my primary research was limited to the British perspective of the situation, I also 
surveyed secondary literature on the colonial period in Egypt, which draws from both 
British and Egyptian sources. My contribution to this literature lies in a close reading of a 
substantial cluster of primary sources from a short but high-profile period in the history of 
British Empire, Egyptian nationalism, and anti-colonial internationalism.  
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Chapter 1: Fellahin 
Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 as a leading colonial power with financial and 
strategic plans in mind.13 Egypt was an extremely important colonial venture for the British 
because the events that precipitated their occupation would influence what would happen 
in other parts of their empire.14 During their occupation, significant cultural and political 
change occurred in Egypt, which provided insight into changing British strategies of 
colonial domination and rule. Analysis of British reports on fellahin (Egyptian peasants) 
grievances during World War I indicate that the British sought to isolate the fellahin from 
Egyptian society because of the complexity of the post-war period. The British empire not 
only had to protect their colonial position in Egypt, but also had to carefully portray their 
image in a complex international, colonial, and domestic context. Given the unrest amongst 
Egyptian students in the cities, it was imperative to keep the fellahin isolated in the 
provinces. Reforms were implemented that would keep the fellahin illiterate and confined 
to agricultural careers.15 The British hoped this would keep the fellahin on their side. 
British official documents from 1919 suggest that the British perceived World War I as a 
turning point for the fellahin – the point at which they turned against the 
British. This misperception was caused by a combination of ignorance and calculated 
strategy, as British officials consistently underestimated the fellahin and pursued divide 
and rule tactics intended to isolate rural areas from the cities. Although wartime grievances 
                                                      
13 Ronal Robinson, Ronal Edward, and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (St. Martins Press, 
1962), 261. 
14 Tignor, Modernization, 12. 
 15 NA/FO 848/6, Evidence of Mr. R.A. Brown (Controller, Administrative Service, Ministry of 
Education), 7/1/1920, Foreign Office Papers of evidence taken by Mission in Egypt 1919-1920, Mr. 
R.A. Brown states, “by the old system of education, a class was being created entirely unfitted for 
agriculture, the mainspring of Egypt’s prosperity.”  
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were the precipitating cause for the 1919 revolution, they represented the culmination of a 
much longer history of resistance to the British occupation across all sectors of Egyptian 
society.   
In the late nineteenth century, Egypt’s importance to Britain increased following the 
completion of the Suez Canal in November 1869; the canal’s location shortened the trip 
from Britain to India drastically. 16 Maintaining control of the Suez Canal was geopolitically 
and economically strategic, thereby serving the empire’s own interests. Upon arrival in 
Egypt, British officials quickly realized that reforming the Egyptian political and economic 
structure would not be an easy task. Egypt was nearly bankrupt and in debt around 
£100,000,000 because of Khedive17 Ismail’s (1863-1879) excessive spending.18 
Nonetheless, in the first ten years of the occupation, British officials successfully stabilized 
Egypt’s finances, reorganized the administrative system, and reformed the judicial system. 
British administrators in Egypt received considerable attention for their success in this 
period, much of which has been attributed to Counsel General of Egypt, Lord Cromer.19 
The British were well versed colonists by the time they occupied Egypt in 1882. 
With each colonial endeavor the British experimented with ruling techniques to see what 
would be the most effective in a given colony. Thus, when faced with adversity in Egypt, it 
made sense that the British drew on previous techniques that had been successful in other 
                                                      
16 Tignor, Modernization, 12. 
17 The Term Khedive refers to the Viceroy of Egypt under Turkish Rule. 
18 Robert Tignor, “The Indianization of the Egyptian Administration under British Rule,” The 
American Historical Review, vol. 68, No. 3. (April 1963): 636-637. 
19 Daly states, “As an estate manager there is little argument about Cromer’s success. During his 
tenure the proportion of Egypt’s budget devoted to servicing the debt was reduced by half; annual 
government revenue almost doubled, while taxes were progressively reduced; the value of imports 
rose fourfold. Huge sums were expended on irrigation and agriculture, and agricultural 
productivity (admittedly difficult to measure) increased.” 242. 
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colonies. In the case of Egypt, historians have drawn a parallel between ruling techniques 
and implemented reforms in Egypt and India. Tignor explains that “within certain limits, 
therefore, Egyptian modernization during the British occupation was guided by Indian 
models. It was carried out by English officials, drawn almost exclusively from India.”20 
British officials introduced institutions, policies, and programs largely based on what had 
been successful in India. Due to the success in the first ten years of the occupation, it may 
be suggested that the British thought Egypt could be a replica of their apparent success in 
India. Therefore, British officials relied heavily on their experience in India in Egypt. While 
this may have worked to restore Egypt’s financials and stabilize the government, the 
Egyptian unrest during the protectorate and post-World War I period revealed that 
effective ruling techniques differed from colony to colony.21  
From the start of the occupation, British officials professed that the occupation of 
Egypt would be temporary. The Special Mission to Egypt Report states that their goal was 
to “secure the stability and tranquility of Egypt so that it would not be torn by internal 
disturbances and thus threaten England’s strategic route to the East.”22 The Mission 
concludes that the uncertainty of the occupation created the belief amongst Egyptians that 
the British would depart once their finances were straightened out. Historians conclude 
that British authoritie’s lack of transparency about their goals contributed to Egyptian 
resentment.23 For example, the Mission describes, “at the time it was the declared intention 
                                                      
20 TIgnor, “The Indianization,” 661. 
21 This claim is detailed extensively in: Report, Curzon of Kedleson’s report on the Egyptian 
Situation, The National Archives Website: Discovery, Cabinet 24/119/90, Description available at 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D7737092 (accessed January 2018). 
22 Tignor, Modernization, 21. 
23 Daly, 240. 
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of the British Government to evacuate the country as soon as these objects were 
accomplished.”24 Hence, when the British increased their presence in the early twentieth 
century under Lord Cromer, Egyptians professed frustration and resentment. As a result, a 
nationalist movement accelerated in this period, advocating for an independent and self-
governing nation and for the departure of British troops.  
 Egyptian nationalist thought had roots dating back to the early nineteenth century, 
but historians conclude that it did not evolve into a mass movement until the early 
twentieth century.25 The growth of the movement has been attributed to the death of 
Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq in 1892 and the failure of Lord Cromer to reform Egypt’s 
political sphere. Lord Cromer frequently condemned Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq’s 
successor, his seventeen-year-old son. Lord Cromer harped on his inexperience and young 
age to argue that British presence was necessary. His ridiculing statements became a focal 
point for Egyptian opposition to the occupation. Egyptian nationalist leaders’ opposition 
was evident in anti-British newspapers.26 Additionally, nationalist party leaders, such as 
Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, began to emerge as prominent figures in 
opposition to the British. Kamil and Lufti’s ideas became incredibly influential in 
constructing an Egyptian national identity. They fostered a nationalist way of thinking 
amongst Egyptians that strongly influenced the events of the 1919 revolution. 
                                                      
24 NA/CAB 24/117/49, Report of the Special Mission to Egypt 09 December, 1920, The National 
Archives Website: Discovery, Description available at 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D7736849, (accessed November 2017). 
25 Tignor, Modernization, 148. 
26 Daly, 241. 
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 Furthermore, historians refer to the early twentieth century as a “transitional phase 
in the development of modern Egyptian political consciousness.”27 Egyptian political 
consciousness was affirmed in their resentment towards Lord Cromer. Under Lord Cromer, 
recommendations were ignored; measures were not taken to strengthen the constitution; 
and there was no long-term plan for political reform. This caused the British administration 
to be out of touch with the situation in Egypt and concluded that it was difficult for 
Egyptians to support the British occupation when they felt disconnected from the 
administrators governing their nation. Consequently, this led Egyptians to strengthen their 
belief that they were capable of self-governing. 
The Dinshawi incident of 1906 marked a watershed in modern Egyptian history 
because of the mobilization of the labor class as part of the nationalist movement. In the 
village of Dinshawi, an Egyptian woman was accidently shot and killed by a British officer 
while pigeon hunting. This provoked Egyptian villagers to attack British officers in the 
provinces, leaving one British officer dead. As a result, British authorities brought seven 
Egyptian villagers to trial and prosecuted the accused on the grounds of premeditated 
murder. Ultimately, seven Egyptian villagers were executed.28 Egyptians viewed this 
reprisal as savagely unjust and condemned British authorities for how they handled the 
situation. Egyptians professed that it was not justifiable that seven Egyptians were brutally 
executed for the death of one British official.29 Nationalist leaders in the cities saw the 
Dinshawi incident as an opportunity to capitalize on grievances in the provinces and 
organize the working class against the British occupation. They utilized their position to 
                                                      
27 Ibd. 
28 Baron, 28. 
29 Daly, 243. 
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strengthen their fight for national independence. Historians emphasize that the Dinshawi 
incident was one of the most formative moments in the nationalist movement: “what began 
as a minor fracas, and should have remained a routine police matter, ended as a two-
headed icon of Egyptian nationalist mythology and British imperialism.”30 The incident was 
a turning point for the nationalist movement because it realized that mass mobilization to 
achieve independence was not only necessary but possible.  
 Following the Dinshawi incident, the nationalist movement recognized the 
capability workers and peasants had to gain British attention. In efforts to organize a labor 
party, nationalist leaders implemented formal organizations, such as schools and unions. 
People’s Night Schools were created in the Higher School Club, which forged a network 
between middle class activists and workers by providing instruction in literacy, 
mathematics, language arts, social sciences, religion, and hygiene.  31 Additionally, the 
“Manual Trades Workers’ Union” was established to provide organization to labor party 
activism.32 These advancements marked the changing dynamic between urban and rural 
populations during this period. Beinin states that the pre-war period was “a period of 
embryonic development preceding and making possible the real birth of the movement in 
1919” because “for the first time Egyptian workers emerged as the subjects of the historical 
process and not only as its objects, as agents acting on their own behalf despite adverse 
circumstances.”33 Historians characterize the period preceding the war to be imperative to 
the success of the 1919 revolution because it saw the integration of peasants and laborers 
                                                      
30 Ibd. 
31 Beinin, The Contemporary Middle East, 67. 
32 Ibd, 68. 
33 Ibd, 82. 
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into the nationalist movement and the emergence of broad-based support for national 
unity and independence.34  
 In December 1914, at the onset of World War I, Britain proclaimed a protectorate 
over Egypt.35 Given the strategic importance of the Suez Canal, this was a way for the 
British to secure their position in Egypt. With the protectorate, British officials vowed to 
protect Egypt during the war and ensured that the protectorate was a developmental step 
towards an independent Egypt. The British did not properly estimate how significantly the 
war would affect their colonies, which caused the Egyptian nation to suffer immeasurably. 
It also led to an increase of British troops, the requisitioning of labor and resources, and 
inflated prices, which disproportionately affected the fellahin in the provinces.36 Grievances 
associated with the war caused the fellahin to suffer immensely, but because they thought 
that the protectorate was a temporary wartime measure, they were hopeful that it would 
be abolished after the war. Yet the war  
impressed upon Britain the paramount strategic importance of Egypt, and any 
political settlement with the Egyptian nationalists after the war had to be one that 
did not jeopardize British strategic control of the area.37 
 
When the British government failed to abolish the protectorate after the war, the Egyptian 
population, from cities to the countryside, was collectively outraged. While historians 
regard the 1919 revolution as a predictable outcome, the British professed surprise.  
 The years subsequent to World War I placed the British empire in a complex 
international context with the formation of the League of Nations, introduction of the 
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mandate system, and President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ speech. The British empire was 
under significant scrutiny in this period. The League of Nations was comprised of the 
victors of World War I and sought to generate best practices of international governance. 
The system fundamentally guaranteed the continuation of colonial rule and implemented 
general guidelines for how to rule each country.38  Simultaneously, President Wilson gave 
his ‘Fourteen Points’ speech on January 8th, 1918, that advocated for every nation’s right to 
self-determination, which was overwhelmingly popular amongst colonial nations.39 Thus, 
the League of Nations had to carefully balance how the mandate system was introduced 
and implemented in order to protect European interests in these countries. Under this new 
pressure, the British had to be incredibly strategic about how they portrayed their position 
in British colonies.  
The British did not anticipate the enthusiasm with which their subjects internalized 
President Wilson’s speech. In a telegram to Lord Allenby, Ayerst Henham Hooker, a British 
expat in Egypt discloses: 
The speeches of President Wilson have made a great impression on the minds of 
agitators, and have stimulated them to immediate action. They thought that the 
moment had arrived when they could make a combined movement with some 
prospect of success.40 
 
President Wilson’s speech fostered expectations of immediate action, which did not 
materialize.41 In Egypt, President Wilson’s speech had given the nation hope that their goal 
of self-governance was tangibly accessible. Furthermore, Egyptian nationalists were 
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optimistic that President Wilson would hold true to his proclamations for self-
determination and would not recognize the British protectorate. Yet, when the United 
States acknowledged the protectorate in Egypt, the Egyptian nation felt betrayed. In The 
Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism, Erez Manela argues: 
the disillusionment that followed the collapse of this ‘Wilsonian moment’ fueled a 
series of popular protest movements across the Middle East and Asia, heralding the 
emergence of anticolonial nationalism as a major force in world affairs.42 
 
Hence, when British officials decided to prohibit nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul from 
attending the Paris Peace Conference, the nation responded with revolution. The 1919 
Egyptian revolution was one of many upheavals that revealed the international dimensions 
of anti-colonial nationalism.43   
The British government sent a Special Mission to Egypt in 1921 to investigate the 
causes of the revolution in 1919. The Mission hoped to clear up misconceptions about the 
occupation and enhance the empire’s image by appearing to be concerned with the status 
of Egyptians. The report was published in 1921 and put particular emphasis on the 
situation of the fellahin during the war in order to address what made them impressionable 
to nationalist agitation. The Mission discloses: 
Unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as had already been pointed out, 
manifest long before the crisis of 1919. But that it should have spread to the fellahin 
and should have led to outbreaks of savage violence among a class, which has 
derived such immense benefits from the British Occupation needs explaining.44 
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Correspondence in British official documents corroborates the Mission’s statement and 
affirms that the British considered the mass mobilization of fellahin in the revolution 
something that needed to be explained. These documents conclude that the obvious factors 
that influenced the fellahin were: the recruiting for the Egyptian Labor and Camel 
Transport Corps; the requisition of domestic animals; the requisition of cereals; the rise in 
food prices; and the collection for the Red Cross Fund.45  The Mission perceives that “these 
factors had contributed by the end of 1918 to create a condition of discontent and unrest 
among the fellahin and some loss of confidence in the benefits of British administration.”46 
Furthermore, the 1919 report, “Political Conditions in Provinces,” states, “the fellahin are 
discontented because after many years of protection from exploitation they have been 
seriously exploited during the war.”47 It was not, therefore, the declaration of the 
protectorate or British wartime policies that were resented, but the way they were 
implemented in Egypt.48  
In 1914 Great Britain established the Egyptian Labor and Camel Transport Corps in 
efforts to employ Egyptians in the war effort. The British recruited Egyptian laborers to 
work for the British Army in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. Their work supported the 
logistical needs of the British army, such as railway construction and transporting supplies 
on camelback. Wartime mobilization efforts were crucial for Great Britain to maintain its 
position in the war. To recruit, British agents visited provinces and advertised the benefits 
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of enlisting in the labor and transport corps for six months.49 The British claimed to believe 
that, for the fellahin, joining the Egyptian Labor and Camel Transport Corps was the 
rational decision, and they perceived the first round of recruitment to have been successful. 
In a telegram to Lord Allenby, Hooker, explains that “the men recruited had the time of 
their lives, good pay, good food, clothing and infinitely better conditions than they had ever 
experienced before.”50 Hooker strategically highlights the perks of enlisting to affirm that 
the British were providing the fellahin opportunities that would not exist without the 
British occupation. He continues, “the wages paid were of great benefit to the poorer 
classes of the population.”51 There was no doubt that the British saw the Egyptian Labor 
and Camel Transport Corps as a golden opportunity for the fellahin, given “their readiness 
to re-enlist again and again.”52 According to the British, grievances did not arise until “the 
voluntary system had ceased to supply a sufficient number of recruits,” causing 
administrative pressure to become abusive.53  
  Press gang methods were apparently employed by the Omdeh (native officials)54 to 
recruit when the fellahin no longer voluntarily enlisted. The 1919 report, “Political 
Conditions in Provinces,” explains, “enlistments to the E.LC. and C.T.C. were entirely in the 
hands of the Omdeh who sold exemptions and enlisted their personal enemies. Men were 
enlisted often after exemptions had been paid.”55 In a letter to Lord Allenby, Reverend 
Macintyre, a member of the Church Missionary, notes that he knows of a case “where a 
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young man enlisted voluntarily for six months in Palestine, and the very day after his 
return to his village was forced by threats to sign on again, and sent back at once.”56 The 
British perceived fellahin discontent to be with the conscription methods used by the 
Omdeh, who were left unsupervised in the provinces. The war pulled experienced British 
officials out of the provinces, giving the Omdeh the power to “take advantage of the 
position, sending their enemies to serve, while letting off their friends and accepting bribes 
for exemptions and substitutions.”57 The British consistently blamed the Omdeh for 
employing press gang methods in the provinces,58 but the mission admits that “British 
pressure was asserted as the excuse for them.”59 Consequently, it is not surprising that 
British documents dissect the role of the Omdeh during the war to prove that these 
grievances were not their fault. Hooker concludes that “great laxity was shown, in allowing 
vast amount of unsupervised compulsory power to be placed in the hands of the rich and 
unscrupulous provincial Omdeh.”60 It is important to note that this was “unsupervised” 
power to deflect the blame on the greedy and corrupt Omdeh. The British believed that the 
abuses were due to a lack of supervision and reported that grievances from the fellahin 
were caused by the inability of British colonial administrators to regulate Omdeh power.  
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 In regard to the collection for the Red Cross Fund, reports suggested that the lack of 
British authorities in the provinces allowed the Omdeh to take advantage of the fellahin 
again. In a letter to Field Marshall Henry Wilson, Lord Allenby expresses that “collections 
made, throughout the country, for the Red Cross Fund. This is a very real grievance.”61 The 
Mission professes that collections “intended to be voluntary, were in practice, frequently 
made compulsory by officials seeking to acquire merit by the amounts which their districts 
contributed.”62 Comparable to how British officials attributed involuntary Labor Corps 
recruitment to the Omdeh, the Mission argues that the collections for the Red Cross were 
supposed to be voluntary, yet again, due to lack of supervision the Omdeh took advantage 
of their position of power. They conclude that this led to the belief that “only a portion of 
the total amount collected reached its real destination.”63 The British were scapegoating 
Egyptians by insinuating that native Omdeh officials stole and forced contributions from 
the poor fellahin, who were already suffering during the war. The Mission explains:  
to entrust the collection to local Egyptian officials was inevitably to open the door to 
abuses, entailing additional pressure on the poorer classes, with whom many other 
circumstances made the war unpopular.64   
 
It was beneficial to harp on the inadequacy of the Omdeh to secure their position in Egypt.  
The British asserted the importance of colonial rule by blaming native officials for fellahin 
grievances by portraying them as greedy and untrustworthy when not under the 
supervision of the British.  
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 Reports also claim that British officials in the provinces were not cautious enough 
when requisitioning materials for the war.65 The Mission describes that “the fellahin were 
most unwilling to part with their animals” and “often hardly hit by the removal of [their] 
means to transport.”66 British officials did not feel that the requisition of animals was a 
justified grievance because requisitions were “inevitable in a state of war.”67 They 
perceived that the grievance was that the British paid fair prices for animals at the start of 
the war, but the prices for the Egyptians to buy them back at the end of the war were 
significantly higher.68 Conversely, the Mission viewed the fellahin’s discontent concerning 
the requisition of cereals to be more legitimate because they did not bear the blame. In the 
requisitioning of cereals, “districts were assessed to furnish a given quantity, and the 
collection was left to local officials, who derived large profits from the transaction.”69 In the 
case of wheat, the Omdeh collected larger quantities of wheat than required and profited 
by selling them at higher market rates. If individuals were unable to meet the given wheat 
quantity, they were forced to purchase their quota at market rates and return it for a lower 
requisition rate. This caused the average consumption of wheat to drop drastically by 1918, 
which led to shortages in the provinces and the cities. Ultimately, the British concluded that 
the Omdeh made huge profits, while the fellahin continued to suffer. For example, the 
report, “The Present Situation and Its Difficulties,” claims: 
The recent phenomenal increase of wealth in Egypt is not only precarious itself, but 
its benefits are mainly confined to one class, the landowners, great and small. On the 
other hand, the landless portion of the peasantry and the lower orders of the towns 
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are suffering terribly from the scarcity of essential food stuffs and the rise of 
prices.70 
 
The Mission argues, “the local officials were mainly responsible for the abuses which 
occurred, but they were attributed to the British, who, under the exceptional conditions 
prevailing, were unable to control them.”71 Not only did the Mission blame the Omdeh for 
this grievance, but they used the war as an excuse for not controlling the situation in the 
provinces. It was necessary to assert that the war caused “exceptional conditions” that they 
“were unable to control” to argue that this was not the normal happenstance in Egypt.  
Sir Thomas Russell Pasha72, a police officer in the Egyptian service, recounts fellahin 
grievances in his autobiography, Egyptian Service. He describes that the fellah 
was forced to give up his donkey and his camel, without which he could not 
transport his produce. True, a fair price was fixed by the Army, but by the time it 
reached him much had stuck to other fingers. In any case no money could 
compensate for the loss of his beasts of burden, which were irreplaceable and his 
resentment against the British grew till it reached a burning heat when his cereal 
and other crops were also commandeered.73 
 
Based on Russell Pasha’s claim, the British perceived that the grievance was that the 
fellahin felt robbed by the British Army and deceived by how requisitions were carried out. 
They concluded that the fellahin held the British accountable for their suffering during the 
war because they had been assured they would be protected by the British.  Russell Pasha 
argues that “it must have been very hard during the First World War for the fellah of an 
Egyptian village to understand what was going on in the world outside Egypt.”74 He 
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continues that “as the war went on, he found more and more being demanded of him by 
these same British for reasons that he was incapable of appreciating.”75 It can be suggested 
that Russell Pasha’s autobiography was intended for an international audience that 
understood the scope of World War I. Thus, it was advantageous to portray the fellahin as 
ignorant about the consequences of war and disconnected. He insinuates that if the fellahin 
understood the complexity of World War I, they would recognize the necessity of 
requisitioning materials for wartime measures. 
Food shortages caused by wartime measures also hit the fellahin class hard.76 This 
occurred because of the excess of food exports for the war, inflated prices, and the 
requisition of local food and resources. 77 Additionally, the war affected the international 
economy and the state’s manipulation of resources exacerbated the food shortages.  78 In 
Egypt, the fellahin suffered the consequence of inflation on everyday necessities, such as 
“corn, clothing, and fuel.”79 The Mission explains that “a family of four – a man, his wife and 
two small children – could not, at the beginning of 1919, obtain a sufficiency of food except 
at a cost which considerably exceeded the ordinary rate of wages.”80 British reports state 
that the fellahin’s wages were insufficient to meet the cost of standard living, and the 
progressive rise of prices throughout the war gave the fellahin reason to fear they would 
starve. Additionally, British reports suggest that while the fellahin continued to struggle, 
“they saw a limited number of their countrymen and the unpopular foreigner making large 
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fortunes.”81 According to Reverend Macintyre, this led the fellahin to believe that “get rid of 
the English and all our troubles will cease.”82 By contrast, the British argued that it was not 
their presence, but wartime conditions, that caused problems for the fellahin and made 
them vulnerable to nationalist propaganda.83 
When the war ended in 1918, Britain did not abolish the protectorate because it was 
imperative to protect Britain’s essential interests in Egypt, first and foremost the 
maintenance of imperial communications through the Suez Canal.84 The Mission explains 
that the Egyptians hoped Britain would dissolve the protectorate because they had viewed 
it as a temporary wartime measure. This idea was rooted in their understanding “that 
efforts would be made at the end of the war to satisfy their national aspirations.”85 Indeed, 
continued British presence in Egypt was met with severe hostility from nationalist party 
leaders, such as Saad Zaghlul. Zaghlul had been an active member in the nationalist party 
since the beginning of the British occupation and was characterized as the lead “agitator” in 
the nationalist movement.86 Directly following the war, Zaghlul requested permission to 
travel to Paris to advocate for total Egyptian independence. The report, “Indian and 
Egyptian Conspirators in England and the Remedy,” proclaims that Zaghlul 
now makes a great point of ‘having waited till the Allies had won the war and signed 
the Armistice’ before beginning to agitate. Without open incitements to revolt, 
however, he succeeded, during the four years of war, in making very thorough 
preparations for a rising, and as soon as the Armistice was signed he demanded the 
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right to go to Paris with a mandate from the people, to claim complete independence 
for Egypt.87 
 
The international climate following the war and heightened focus on the status of imperial 
nations had fostered hope amongst Egyptians that independence was a feasible goal.88 
Zaghlul’s request was denied because his persistent nature and ability to rally Egyptians 
against the protectorate was perceived to be the root of the chaos. It can also be suggested 
that British officials denied his request because he would be a bad reflection of the empire’s 
work in Egypt at the Paris Peace Conference. This decision was met with severe backlash 
from the Egyptian population and Zaghlul “became more and more truculent in his 
demands and language and began to organize a widespread rebellion.”89 Consequently, 
British officials decided to arrest and deport Zaghlul and his associates to the British 
colony, Malta. The British expressed that they hoped this would put an end to the disorder 
in Egypt.90 Instead, this resulted in a mass movement of the Egyptian people.91  
To the British’s surprise, the week following their arrest, demonstrations broke out 
in the cities, which quickly spread to the provinces. This sparked a revolution amongst the 
Egyptian nation that “was a national movement backed by the sympathy of all classes and 
creeds among this Egyptian population.”92 British official documents put emphasis on 
events in the provinces because they quickly escalated into a brutal revolt within the week. 
They explain: 
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By the 14th and 15th March trouble had spread to most of the Delta provinces, where 
attempts to interrupt communication had become general. On the 16th the railway 
and telegraphic communication between Cairo and the delta, as well as with Upper 
Egypt was broken. By the 18th the provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Menufia and 
Dakkhalia were in a state of open revolt.93 
 
Thus, the Mission admits that “the consequences of deporting the Nationalist leaders were 
not rightly estimated.”94 Hooker explains to Lord Allenby that “what was not expected was 
the careful and extensive preparation of the movement, which included Moslems, Copts 
and Bedouins, not to mention practically the whole Agricultural population.”95 Their 
reaction to the 1919 revolution suggests that because Britain ruled through divide and rule 
tactics, they were not prepared for a unified response and considered it an anomaly. 
Hooker affirms this and states “it is the first time in modern Egyptian history that the whole 
of the native population has co-operated in a political movement.”96 British officials’ 
reaction indicated that they saw the fellahin sector of society to be isolated from nationalist 
propaganda in the cities. This was a convenient perception because it helped them make 
the case for the benefits of the protectorate.97 Yet, the fellahin’s participation in the revolt 
suggested that the British underestimated their political consciousness. 
British reports produced after the 1919 revolution assess its causes and primarily 
focus on fellahin grievances during the war, ignoring a much longer history of resistance to 
the occupation. While the Dinshawi incident in 1906 was smaller scale than the revolution 
of 1919, both mobilizations crossed sectors of society. Despite this history, in a letter to 
Field Marshall Wilson, Lord Allenby states, “for the first time since 1882 they are against 
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us. Previously, the fellahin have been our friends.”98 It was beneficial to portray the fellahin 
to be supporters of the occupation, victims of corrupt Egyptian officials, and lackeys of 
urban nationalist leaders. Further, the British used divide and rule tactics in Egypt to avoid 
a similar situation that happened in India. The report, “Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in 
England and the Remedy,” describes “the details of the rising are too well known to need 
repetition. It bears many points of resemblance to the beginning of the Indian Mutiny.”99 As 
a result, British officials attempted to isolate the fellahin through divide and rule tactics to 
avoid a similar situation in Egypt. Yet their participation in the revolution revealed that 
these tactics had failed because Egyptians were actually significantly more unified in their 
perception and rejection of colonialism than the British understood or were prepared to 
admit.  
The image of the isolated and ignorant fellahin appears throughout the Special 
Mission report and British official documents. The Mission asserts that during the 1919 
revolution “the disorders were confined to the neighborhood or large centers and to 
districts along the main lines of communication,”100 while “in remoter villages, less readily 
accessible to propagandists and agitators, little disposition was shown by the small farmers 
to take part in any such movement.”101 It seems to have been important to insist that a 
sector of the fellahin population did not participate in the revolt in order to justify the 
British imperial project in Egypt. They divided the fellahin population based on 
geographical location to explain why certain sectors participated in the revolt. The 
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disturbances that took place near lines of communication occurred because the British 
perceived they were able to access cities, which were the centers of unrest. This suggested 
that the British did not believe the fellahin would have acted independently. They 
consistently blamed “agitators” in the cities for fueling fellahin resentment towards the 
British. Hooker affirms that “the nationalist leaders made the most of the growing 
discontent, and at once started propaganda that would appeal to the passions and 
prejudices of the fellahin.”102 Their participation in the revolution implies that the fellahin 
were not as ignorant or isolated as the British perceived. It also suggested that the stark 
social divisions described in British official documents were not the reality in Egypt.  
 The British insisted on these divisions because they were useful in legitimizing 
British wartime strategy and ongoing occupation. Given the unrest in the cities, it was 
expedient to focus on the fellahin’s dependence on British support and their alleged 
victimization or brainwashing by other sectors of Egyptian society. Indeed, throughout 
British official documents, the British portrays the fellahin to be the principal supporters 
and beneficiaries of the occupation. For example, the foreign office report “The Present 
Situation and Its Difficulties,” states:  
There is no general hostility to the British amongst the fellahin or smaller 
landowners. Any manifestations of such hostility have been due to the influence of 
Nationalist emissaries from the towns, exploiting religious feeling or temporary 
grievance connected with the war.103 
 
The British did not take responsibility for the grievances they caused, but instead blamed 
the Omdeh for abusing power and mistreating the fellahin. This is evident in the Mission’s 
depiction of wartime grievances They portray wartime measures, such as the Egyptian 
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Labor and Camel Transport Corps, as profitable opportunities. Therefore, they attribute the 
fellahin’s grievances to British officials’ disappearance from the provinces, which made the 
fellahin more susceptible to abuse by native authorities.104 The Mission concludes: 
those unfortunate incidents of the war period, to which we have already alluded, 
shook for a time their confidence in our justice and good-will, and were 
predisposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British feeling in the spring of 
1919.105 
 
Therefore, it was the “unfortunate incidents of the war period” that caused the fellahin to 
resent the British occupation because they had failed to act as their protectors.106 
Moreover, the British maintains that “agitation among the fellahin was of a far more partial 
character than has been generally supposed.”107 Nonetheless, by painting this as a turning 
point, they were able to admit that the fellahin were far less isolated and ignorant than they 
presumed. 108 
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Chapter 2: Women 
Based on the feminist activism that occurred over the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, it is hard to believe that the participation of women in the 1919 
revolution came as a surprise to the British. Their astonishment indicated that the British 
believed their attempts to narrow education opportunities would keep women isolated 
from the nationalist movement. Egyptian women’s participation in the movement revealed 
their discontent with the occupation and further threatened the security of the empire. For 
that reason, the British had to defend the occupation and portrayed Egyptian women to be 
unintelligent, ignorant, and powerless by playing on gender stereotypes to justify the need 
for continued British presence. In British official documents, the British constantly harp on 
the constraints of the Islamic religion on women to explain their lack of attention to female 
reforms during the occupation. Similar to the portrayal of the fellahin, British officials 
downplayed women’s participation in the revolution because it was essential to maintain 
that Egyptians were disunited, backwards, and ill-prepared for self-rule in the international 
context after the war. Additionally, an international feminist movement was rapidly 
spreading across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, which made it imperative for the 
British to justify their treatment of women to audiences at home and abroad. Already in the 
early years of the occupation, British officials narrowed educational opportunities for 
women and sought to undermine the feminist movement by dividing women by class, 
occupation, and residence. At the same time, they claimed to be doing everything they 
could to improve the status of Egyptian women. 
Prior to the occupation, an Egyptian feminist consciousness had existed alongside 
the nationalist movement in the late nineteenth century. The British constantly took credit 
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for the emergence of an Egyptian feminist movement in British official documents, yet 
historiography reveals that its origins dated to before the occupation. Over the course of 
Muhammad Ali’s reign in Egypt (1805-48), efforts were made to modernize Egypt through 
industrial, education, social, and technology reforms. 109 In particular, these reforms 
opened new opportunities for upper- and middle-class Egyptian women.110 For example, 
the school for midwives opened in 1832 and the first girls’ state school was established in 
1837. Muhammad Ali also permitted tutors to teach in women’s homes, which fostered an 
educated class of Egyptian women. The results of Muhammad Ali’s female education 
reforms became visible in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when Egyptian 
women began to teach in schools and publish books, journals, and articles. 111 
The role of the Egyptian women’s press played an integral role in the construction of 
the feminist national identity alongside the Egyptian nationalist movement. Although 
women’s journals had existed, historians mark 1907 as a turning point for women 
periodicals because of the effect their publications had on the British occupation. Following 
the Dinshawi incident in 1906, the women’s press became exceedingly vocal against the 
British occupation. For example, Fatima Rashid established the Jam’iyyat Tarqiyat al-Mar’a 
(The Society for Women’s Progress) and began holding meetings in her home to discuss the 
status of Muslim women in Egypt. Jam’iyyat Tarqiyat al-Mar’a published articles that 
advocated for female rights and backed the nationalist party’s efforts.112 In reaction to the 
Dinshawi incident, they published articles that condemned the British authorities for their 
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harsh and unjust treatment towards Egyptian villagers and portrayed British officials in the 
provinces as savage colonists. Through these publications, a relationship formed between 
feminists and nationalist leaders. Egyptian women’s stern opposition to the British 
occupation in their journals impressed upon the nationalist party the importance of 
championing women’s rights as part of their campaign against the British occupation.  
Beinin affirms this claim and states: 
elite men and women began to encourage the women’s awakening - education of 
women and their entry into white-collar professions (at least until marriage or after 
widowhood), and the formation of women’s social and political organizations - as 
expressions of a national revival.113 
 
With the support of Egyptian men, Egyptian women took on new roles in society.  
In the early twentieth century, Egyptian women began convening discretely in 
segregated public spaces. Upper- and middle-class Egyptian women became headmasters 
and teachers in the new Egyptian University in 1908, held female lectures, and established 
philanthropic societies.114 Emerging feminist leader, Huda Sha’rawi, held lectures at the 
Egyptian University that encouraged women to pursue higher education degrees and new 
careers, and pushed women to challenge societal traditions, such as the veil. In 1909 Huda 
Sha’rawi founded the first female philanthropic society, Mabarrat Muhammad Ali.  
Mabarrat Muhammad Ali functioned as a medical center for lower-class Egyptian women 
and introduced women’s health care to poor Egyptian communities. Historians emphasize 
that organizations such as, Mabarrat Muhammad Ali, allowed Egyptian women to gain 
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organizational and management experience that was integral in preparing them for the 
1919 revolution. 115 
Feminist activity at the turn of the century was less visible to the British because it 
had been occurring in private and segregated spaces. Yet in the early twentieth century 
Egyptian women confidently entered the public sphere to join causes with the nationalist 
movement. In The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem, Matiel Mogannam describes, 
“Egypt can now boast of many women writers and reformers who have won for themselves 
a world-wide reputation. Even in the political field these ladies have proved to be an 
invaluable asset to their country.”116 For example, in 1909 Egyptian women were asked to 
join the British Lady Cromer society, but declined the offer on nationalist grounds.117 
Instances like this revealed that Egyptian women demanded their civil rights through the 
nationalist platform. In 1910, Egyptian feminist, Inshira Shawqi voiced her support for the 
nationalist movement in a letter read by the congress chairman at the Nationalist Congress 
in Brussels. 118 Present or not, Egyptian women were publically voicing their support for 
the nationalist movement. A year later, in 1911 Egyptian women entered the public sphere 
when Egyptian feminist, Malak Hifini Nasif, attended the all-male nationalist meeting of the 
Egyptian Congress in Egypt to publically voice feminist demands. This marked a watershed 
in Egyptian feminist history, as women advocated for their rights in a male forum.  
 Now that Egyptian women had entered the public sphere and voiced their support 
for the nationalist movement, the British became concerned with the condition of Egyptian 
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women in the early twentieth century. In “Competing, Overlapping, and Contradictory 
Agendas: Egyptian Education Under British Occupation, 1882-1922,” Mona Russell 
describes that “the British in general, and Cromer, in particular, used the ‘lowly’ position of 
women in Egypt as a justification for the occupation.”119  The British constantly connected 
the status of women to the advancement of Egyptian society to justify the need for colonial 
rule. Lord Cromer concluded that the only way to enhance Egyptian women’s position was 
through education reforms. 120 It was advantageous for Cromer to boast about the lowly 
status of Egyptian women and champion the Egyptian feminist movement because it 
justified the British occupation. He constantly professed that the status of Egyptian women 
had been neglected until the British intervened and credited the British for any instance of 
female advancement. While Lord Cromer advocated that female education reforms would 
elevate the lowly status of women, the British in fact narrowed education opportunities by 
refining the curriculum to be focused on teaching domesticity for women. British 
documents reveal that under the British, government run schools taught cooking, laundry, 
ironing, and sewing, which they professed was a more practical use of female education.  121 
Conversely, Mona Russell describes that Egyptian women “viewed the entrance of such 
subjects in the curriculum with disdain”122 and concludes that “it is clear that the 
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overweening push to domesticity was neither popular nor efficient.”123 It is evident that the 
British administration narrowed education reforms to keep them isolated from the 
nationalist movement and evolving international feminist movement. Their apparent 
support for Egyptian women was a façade to enhance their stance with the British 
suffragette movement and image as a colonial power.  
The end of World War I generated an international discussion about the status of 
colonial nations and how they were governed. A main concern of these discussions was the 
status of colonial women. Countless articles, periodicals, and reports that discussed the 
status of women in British colonies circulated in Europe. Historians suggest that colonial 
women were such a focal point because of the emerging international feminist 
movement.124 In particular, attention was drawn to the prevalence of feminist movements 
in Middle Eastern countries.  This was evident in Iran, Palestine, and India.125 In regard to 
the British empire, women’s rights were a debated topic due to the development of the 
British women’s suffragette movement in the twentieth century. Therefore, when Egyptian 
women participated in the 1919 revolution, the British empire had to carefully construe a 
narrative that downplayed women’s participation and was favorable of the occupation.  
After the war, colonial support groups emerged in England that criticized British 
ruling tactics used in British colonies. These groups made claims that accused British 
officials of abusing colonial women, which were troublesome because this degraded the 
empire’s reputation. British officials often referred to these groups as “conspirators” and 
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expressed fear of them plotting to stir up domestic and colonial disturbances.126 For 
example, the Egyptian Association in Great Britain was a support group based in London 
that was vocally opposed to the occupation. Their mission was to voice Egyptian grievances 
and bring attention to the unjust continuation of the protectorate following the war. After 
British officials denied Egypt the right to speak on their own behalf at the Paris Peace 
Conference, the Egyptian Association in Great Britain submitted a petition on behalf of the 
Egyptian people, stating that recognition of the British protectorate would be “a complete 
violation of his well-known principles of justice and fair play to the weak as well as the 
strong nations.”127 Given that British censorship laws prohibited Egyptians from freely 
publishing articles, the Egyptian Association in Great Britain used their domestic platform 
to speak on behalf of Egyptians.  
In May of 1919 the Egyptian Association addressed a letter to the British 
government in regard to the conduct of the British military in Egyptian provinces. The 
letter is written by the Egyptian Association’s secretary, H.Y. Awad, and includes a report of 
the Giza Provincial Council provided by Mr. Tadros J. Makar128 that accuses British military 
authorities of committing gross atrocities against Egyptians. Awad exclaims, “we appeal to 
all Englishmen who love the fair name of their country to remain unstained, who are proud 
of the British traditions and who believe in justice and fair play to come in our help.”129 He 
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suggests that if Englishmen did not accept his appeal, the country’s reputation could be 
tarnished. Awad goes on to cite examples that stressed the mistreatment of women and 
arbitrary brutality. For instance, he describes, “villages [that] have been bombed and raised 
to the ground. Women and children being slain while these repressive measures were 
being carried out and peaceful demonstrators have been fired upon with machine guns.”130 
Awad’s depictions portrays British soldiers as savagely and unjustly attacking Egyptians.  
Similar claims are made in the report itself, dated April 9th, 1919. This report 
includes council members’ description of atrocities committed by the British military in the 
Giza provinces during the revolution. A member recounts his experience: 
My wife and three daughters (the eldest of whom is only eight years old) were 
terrified and got under the bed-steads. The soldiers entered my wife’s room and 
dragged her out by her hair. They did the same to my children. The earrings of my 
children were forcibly snatched from their ears tearing the flesh. My wife’s necklace 
and bracelets, too, were snatched away inflicting cuts on the neck and hands. Then 
the troops ransacked my house taking over three hundred pounds from my safe as 
well as the remainder of my wife’s jewelry tearing up all my valuable papers; then 
they ordered us out of the house which they then set on fire.131 
 
He concludes by observing that troops 
tore the clothes of the women insulting them by touching their naked bodies; this 
sight was too much for me and I was overcome. I have not the slightest doubt that 
unfortunate women had suffered the disgrace of the violation of their honor.”132  
 
His statements are filled with emotion. From stripping women of their jewelry to tearing 
off their clothes and touching their bodies, the assault on the women of the provinces 
clearly crossed a line for the council members. It also appears to have crossed a line for the 
British government. These accusations posed a serious threat given the current domestic 
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and international contexts. With the British suffragette and Egyptian nationalist movement 
working to spread awareness about the condition of colonial women, this report focusing 
on the treatment of Egyptian women was source of serious concern. It also had the ability 
to stir up further nationalist unrest Egypt, direct additional scrutiny to the actions of the 
British military in other colonies, and tarnish the reputation of the British empire in the 
League of Nations. As well, the accusations made in this report bear resemblance to claims 
made following the Dinshawi incident.133 Once again, this report degrades British troops by 
portraying their behavior as savage and merciless. In this complex context it was 
imperative that the British government defend itself against these accusations.  
In “Parliamentary Debates: Official Report constituted between May 19th to June 6th 
1919,” the coalition government and principal officers of the House of Commons discuss 
concerns about the Egyptian Association in Great Britain’s allegations about British troops. 
Foremost, committee members ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what 
measures would be taken to cease further publications from this group. Sir John Butcher 
(1st Baron Danesfort, Conservative Party politician) askes, “whether he [Secretary of State 
for the Home Department] will take immediate steps to prevent the further publication of 
this circular and to bring those responsible for its publication to justice.”134 Major Earl 
Winterton (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Conservative Party politician) also asks if  
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any action has been taken against any person or persons resident in the Imperial 
Hotel, who have been issuing circulars, on behalf of an organization calling itself the 
Egyptian Association, reflecting on the honor of our troops in Egypt? 135 
 
These statements insinuate that members of Parliament were more concerned with 
stopping these publications than the accusations they made. One motive for stopping these 
publications was the growing international suffragette movement.  Thus, Parliament 
members were specifically attentive to accusations about the treatment of women. 
 Parliament members also attempt to deflect blame onto non-white (colonial) troops 
in the British empire by clearly differentiating them from British troops. Sir Charles Yate 
(1st Baronet, Conservative Party politician) questions “what was the nationality of those 
troops?”136 Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness (1st Baron Moyne, Conservative Party politician) 
answers, “does the hon. Member think that British white troops would drag women out of 
their beds by the hair of their heads? Does he seriously think that?”137 These statements 
suggest that Sir Charles Yate and Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness are trying to lay the blame 
on non-white subjects of the British empire.138 This emphasis on the “white troops” implies 
that someone of their race would never commit this crime. It is also likely that these non-
white troops were Indian, given the number of Indian troops conscripted into the British 
army during World War I. These statements play one colonized group off of another, 
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another example of British using divide and rule tactics to deflect blame. Parliament 
members continue to defend British troops by describing the apparent absurdity of these 
accusations. Captain Frederick Guest (Chief Whip of Prime Minister, David Lloyd George) 
explains:  
General Allenby reports that a press campaign of this kind was evidently being 
worked up by agitators, probably with a view to assisting the Nationalist campaign 
in Paris. He has also reported that the troops showed most praiseworthy restraint, 
often under great provocation.139  
 
This assertion insinuates that this type of press campaign could only be worked up by 
agitators. Given the repetition of the term “agitator” in British official documents, it can be 
suggested that parliament members wanted to convey that unrest was confined to a small 
sector of the population. Additionally, by praising the British troops’ apparent self-control, 
he portrays Egyptians as insubordinate and unruly. He continues: 
In a few cases, where a search for arms had to be made at night, portions of certain 
villages were accidentally set on fire, and women were naturally frightened, but no 
more. It must be remembered that Egyptian villages are made of mud with roofs or 
dry cotton stalks, and fires are always of frequent occurrence.140 
 
Captain Guest’s statement is a stark contrast to the Egyptian Association’s portrayal of this 
event. He deflects the blame from British troops by representing Egyptian villages as 
primitive and dangerous places, where “frightening” fires were “of frequent occurrence.” 
He concludes that, “to anyone who knows British and Colonial troops, and the standard of 
discipline in Indian units, the suggestion that they would maltreat women is manifestly 
absurd.”141 Captain Guest dismissal of the accusations as “absurd” simultaneously paints 
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the Egyptian Association as fanciful and defended the British empire, including its 
composite military made up of significant numbers of Indian troops, as beyond reproach.   
 Comparably, Russell Pasha defends allegations of police brutality towards women. 
British troops and police authorities fell under significant scrutiny because of the harsh 
enforcement methods they used against Egyptian protestors over the course of the 
revolution. At this point, Egyptians had become internationally vocal – from demanding 
their right to attend the Paris Peace Conference to working closely with other colonial 
nations to fight oppressive ruling tactics. As the commandant of the Cairo Police, Russell 
Pasha was responsible for maintaining order in Cairo and shutting down protestors. Under 
domestic pressure to keep the peace in the colonies, it was extremely important to 
vindicate police tactics during the revolution. He describes the difficulty of dealing with 
women protestors because “stopping a procession means force and any force you use to 
women puts you in the wrong.”142 Egyptian women’s participation in the movement was 
problematic for the police force because if they mishandled the situation, it could stir up 
more domestic and international agitation. He also uses gender stereotypes to insinuate 
that male police will always be in the wrong when handling disobedient women. He 
explains: 
at a given signal I closed the cordon and all the ladies found their way opposed by a 
formidable line of Egyptian conscript police, who had been previously warned that 
they were to use no violence but to stand still and, if necessary, let their faces be 
scratched by irate finger-nails.143 
 
Russell Pasha defends his position as police commander by establishing that he informed 
police officials to not use violence, while simultaneously portraying Egyptian women to be 
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inherent savages. He mocks the demonstration by implying that the most harm Egyptian 
women could cause the police was scratching their faces. This demeans the legitimacy of 
the women’s demonstrations by ridiculing their mechanism of attack.  
 Russell Pasha further scorns upper-class women’s demonstrations in a letter 
written to his father during the 1919 revolution. He patronizes the women’s 
demonstrations and emphasizes that their participation brought “a note of comedy” to the 
alarming revolution.144 He continues,  
the idea of being attacked by what they [British police] considered to be extremely 
immodest females amused my men enormously and considerable license was given 
them by their officers to practice their ready peasant wit on the smart ladies who 
confronted them.145  
 
Russell Pasha’s tone is extremely condescending. He suggests that his officers would be 
able to easily outsmart Egyptian women with “their ready peasant wit.”146 Russell Pasha 
consistently asserts that Egyptians were inherently unruly to secure Britain’s position. 
Similar to how members of parliament portrayed the Egyptian Association in Great 
Britain’s accusations to be absurd, Russell Pasha does the same to protect the reputation of 
British officials in the complex international and colonial context.  
 Russell Pasha continues to express contempt for their demonstrations in his 
description of encounters with Egyptian feminists to highlight the anomaly of their 
involvement. These statements are another example of British divide and rule tactics; the 
British wanted to portray women to be indifferent to, or even in favor of, their occupation 
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and thus it was essential to explain away their apparent participation in the revolution. He 
recounts: 
I happened to have a previous acquaintance with this very modern young Egyptian 
woman, who was much in advance of her time in every respect and was by no 
means bien vue by the best families. I intentionally addressed myself to her and thus 
very soon roused the jealousy of other equally smart and beautiful ladies in the 
procession, who all wanted to talk at the same time and who much resented the 
assumption by this particular young woman of the position of Generalissima.  
 
Russell Pasha’s description of this woman as “in advance of her time” and “modern” 
suggests that this was a rarity for Egyptian women. He plays on gender stereotypes by 
emphasizing how easy it was to excite and distract other woman by his presence and 
implies that Egyptian women were not actually concerned with protesting. He continues:  
I found the poor dears in a sorry condition. It was a hot summer’s day. The street to 
which I had penned them had no shade from the pitiless sun and there was nowhere 
to sit except upon the hot curb-stones. Some of the more stalwart tried a few more 
arguments as I apologized for having been so long in bringing them the General’s 
final decision that no procession could be allowed, but it was clear that the majority 
were beat to the world with their complexions ruined by the sun and their feet 
blistered by the hot pavement and unaccustomed exercise.147 
 
Once again, Russell Pasha’s sexist demeanor is evoked in his portrayal of the Egyptian 
women’s demonstrations. He focuses on their physicality by reflecting on how the sun 
affected their appearance and yet again emphasizes the anomaly of this situation by stating 
that they were “beat to the world” and not used to exercise. Furthermore, it is evident that 
Russell Pasha wants to highlight the backwardness of Egyptian society by harping on the 
fact that women were not used to being outdoors because of the constraints of the Islamic 
religion. He concludes that after he shut down their demonstration, “everyone was 
relieved: the ladies were relieved and even thanked me.”148 Russell Pasha portrays himself, 
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and by extension the British empire, as the women’s savior. With each claim made, he 
belittles Egyptian women’s activism and establishes that the British presence was not only 
essential to maintaining order, but also beneficial to Egyptian women. 
 Similarly, in the Special Mission to Egypt report, the British lament the ignorance of 
Egyptian women and boast about how they reformed the educational system to help them. 
The British used female education to justify the need for their occupation. The report states 
that the largest concern was the prevailing illiteracy amongst Egyptian women and 
concludes that “the education of Egyptian women is as yet merely in an initial stage.”149 The 
illiteracy rates are highlighted to portray Egyptian women to be behind in comparison to 
European women and provide an explanation for why girls’ schools were less well-funded 
than boys’ schools. The report describes two distinct school systems for girls – the 
“Vernacular” and the “Europeanized.”150 The “Vernacular” schools were referred to as 
“Maktabs” and were focused on teaching children the Quran by memorization. The report 
explains that in 1897 these Maktabs were “under no form of supervision or control, 
attended by some 3,000 girls and 173,000 boys.”151 The conditions are described as 
“hopeless at the time” and the teachers as “illiterate and incompetent.”152 Yet, according to 
the report, when the British-controlled Ministry of Education intervened and brought the 
Maktabs under their supervision, substantial reforms were made. Once again this implies 
that Egyptians were incapable of running schools until the British intervened and helped 
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reform the system. The Mission reports that in regard to female education “much has been 
done to make the education given in these Maktabs of real practical use to the pupils. 
Regular instruction in needlepoint and hygiene is now given in all of them, with most 
satisfactory results.”153 Female education reforms boasted about in this report actually 
narrowed opportunities for women. Russell mentions in her article, that Egyptian women 
strongly disproved of domestic reforms because they captured the “gender-based 
differences”154 of male and female education under British authority. Rather than offer girls 
and boys the same curriculum, girls’ education was extremely gender specific to keep them 
isolated out of the work force. British officials wanted to receive credit for modernizing 
schools, but also wanted to limit opportunities for different segments of the Egyptian 
population. This was done to isolate Egyptian women from the evolving international 
feminist and domestic nationalist movements with the hopes that they would remain “in 
their place” and refrain from participating in any political movements.  
The Chief Lady Medical Officer of Girls’ Schools, Mrs. Elgood, submitted a report in 
June of 1920 that further reveals that British officials wanted to isolate Egyptian women by 
suppressing education reforms. Like the conclusions reached by the Special Mission to 
Egypt, Mrs. Elgood argues that one of the largest problems in girls’ schools was inadequate 
teachers. She asserts: 
teaching is a profession and no lady, in the Muslim mind, should have a profession. 
In Primary schools the Egyptian teachers are not ladies, being for the most part the 
clever daughters of humble government employees. It may even be said that a 
woman’s chances of marriage were definitely damaged if she becomes a teacher.155 
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Just as British officials had blamed the Omdeh in the provinces for the abuses of the 
fellahin, Mrs. Elgood blames the Muslim religion for the shortage of teachers. She suggests 
that if women had freedom to pursue a profession, like European women, more Egyptian 
women would be educated. Mrs. Elgood also explains that “Mohammedanism, however, 
tactically obstructs progress of education among women.”156 Apparent customs of the 
Muslim religion were used as an excuse for the low literacy rates and to silence the feminist 
nationalists who had strongly advocated for female education. This was extremely 
convenient because the British wanted to portray Egyptian women as “backwards” in order 
to justify their occupation. Dwelling on Egyptian backwardness was a political tactic to 
obstruct Egyptian women from modernizing, without taking the blame. 
 Mrs. Elgood further deflects the responsibility for reforming female schools by 
implying that Egyptian women were inherently incapable of achieving a higher intellectual 
status. Once again, the British played on gender stereotypes. Mrs. Elgood reports: 
when she visited Egyptian ladies, or met them in trams and railway carriages, no 
woman was ever seen reading a newspaper. Their conversation was confined to the 
subjects of cotton, jewelry, clothes, etc. The great tendency was for women to get 
carried away by their emotions and this was the force which would always have to 
be reckoned with.157 
 
She undermines female education by characterizing upper-class Egyptian women to be 
uninterested because their emotions overtook their brains. This implies that no matter 
what attempts British officials made to reform female education, Egyptian women would 
be uninterested in anything but the most frivolous of topics.  
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Because of this, she suggests that education reforms needed to focus on girls 
learning practical skills, rather than math and science like the boys. Her report advises that 
upper-class girls should be taught French rather than English because “it would be more 
useful to them…if they were to learn French, as that is the language of most of their dress 
makers, hair dressers, etc., etc.”158 Mrs. Elgood implies that Egyptian women were 
uninterested in intellectually stimulating subjects and only concerned with feminine 
upkeep. Moreover, recommending that Egyptian women not be taught English, the 
language of their colonizer, limits their ability to follow political developments. While Mrs. 
Elgood presents these recommendations as practical, they in fact narrowed opportunities 
for Egyptian women. Nonetheless, it is evident the British wanted these reforms to appear 
as attempts to improve women’s status.  
In terms of women in the provinces, the report explains that “as far as education 
among the lower classes is concerned, the daughter of a fellah hardly ever goes to school: 
they are quite illiterate and blissfully happy.”159 Throughout British official documents, the 
fellahin are constantly portrayed as content and isolated from the rest of society. The 
division of women by class further reflects British official’s attempts to divide and rule the 
Egyptian population. British assertions about female education in Egypt demonstrate that 
they actively narrowed educational opportunities out of fear that such opportunities would 
lead to increased participation in the nationalist movement and resistance to the British 
occupation. As Lord Cromer had warned in 1908, “whatever we do, education must 
produce its natural results, and one of these natural results, both in India and Egypt, will be 
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the wish to get rid of the foreigner.”160 British officials had introduced a westernized 
education system and literacy program in India, which the British concluded resulted in the 
distaste of British presence.161 The British wanted to prevent the same thing from 
happening in Egypt. 
British officials’ portrayal of Egyptian women further supports the argument that 
the British were still clinging to the hope that dividing Egyptian society would prolong their 
colonial occupation after World War I. Comparable to the portrayal of the fellahin, British 
officials attempted to depict Egyptian women as inherently ignorant and either indifferent 
to or content with the occupation. British officials constantly harped on the constraints of 
Islamic religion and played on gender stereotypes to assert the importance of a colonial 
presence in Egypt. The extent to which they attempted to belittle women’s participation in 
the revolution and isolated all Egyptian women by narrowing educational opportunities 
reveals that the British were extremely defensive about their position in Egypt  
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Chapter 3: Students 
 
 The Report of the Special Mission to Egypt concludes that Egyptian students were 
the main cause of recent disorders and unrest in Egypt before and after the 1919 
revolution. When the Mission entered Egypt, they describe that they were met with 
extreme hostility from the heads of Al-Azhar University, the center of religious teaching, 
and from teachers and students of government run schools.  162  The Mission explains that 
“unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as had already been pointed out, 
manifest long before the crisis of 1919.”163 It was beneficial to British officials characterize 
students as the cause of the unrest because the British knew that the educated Egyptians 
would be discontented with the occupation. Similar to how British officials represented the 
fellahin as isolated in the provinces and the women restricted by of the constraints of the 
Islamic religion, they described students as confined to their social class in the cities. 
Scholars too have emphasized the important role of Egyptian student leadership of the 
nationalist movement, yet British perceptions of student activism present a stark contrast. 
British official documents constantly present students as inherently disobedient in order to 
insinuate that their unrest was irrational and unavoidable. 
Prior to the British occupation in 1882, education had been evolving for years. As 
noted in chapter two, Muhammad Ali’s reforms were instrumental in creating a new 
educated class of Egyptians. 164 He sent Egyptians to study abroad in Europe, established a 
printing press, and opened a series of schools. One of these schools was the School of 
Languages, which made it possible for European works to be translated and circulated 
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throughout the nation.165 This constructed a new generation and network of intellectuals in 
Egypt who used their training in European schools to share their knowledge with the larger 
Egyptian populace.166 Among this new group of Egyptians was Rifa’ah Rafi al-Tahtawi, 
whom historians have deemed one of the most significant reformers of Muhammad Ali’s 
era. 
Rifa’ah Rafi al-Tahtawi spent eight years studying at Al-Azhar before departing on 
the first educational mission to France under Muhammad Ali in 1826.167 His experience 
abroad challenged his way of thinking and gave him a new Western perspective on 
language, sciences, social order, and nationalism. Upon his return to Egypt, he taught in 
schools, advocated for female education, and translated countless European books to make 
them more accessible to Egyptians. In The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, 
Jamal Mohammad Ahmed explains that “before him European learning was practically 
unknown to Egyptians and it may therefore be said that the intellectual movement in Egypt 
began with his studentship in Paris and the book he wrote then.”168 Al-Tahtawi went on to 
publish seventeen books on many topics, ranging from education to social order.  169 
Muhammad Ali instructed that Al-Tahtawi’s books be taught in Egyptians schools and 
received notable attention because of their nationalistic tone. Ahmed describes that al-
Tahtawi’s book Al-Manahji was the most influential book in Egypt in the nineteenth century 
because he “was the first Egyptian who saw Egypt as a nation, distinct from the general 
body of the Islamic community. He saw Egyptian history as something different and 
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continuous.”170 He introduced a new way of thinking about Egypt that fostered the 
foundation for an intellectual movement across the nation.  
Muhammad Ali’s reign ended in 1848 and it was not until 1863 that educational 
reforms in Egypt resumed under the rule of Khedive Ismail. During his reign from 1863 to 
1879, Ismail expanded state schooling to the provinces, established a national library and 
museum, and promoted educational missions abroad.171 In addition to creating specialized 
schools in the cities, Khedive Ismail was dedicated to growing primary education in the 
provinces. Education in the provinces was essential because of the opportunities it created 
for lower class Egyptians. Furthermore, he standardized the nation’s curriculum and 
testing system. Besides Muhammad Ali, scholars acknowledge Khedive Ismail’s education 
reforms to be fundamental in the making of a modern Egypt. Vatikiotis claims: 
the period 1863-82 was the most crucial in the evolution of modern Egypt, for the 
vast educational and intellectual strides made by Egyptians after 1882 had 
interesting and, in many ways, enduring social and political consequences.172  
 
Furthermore, Beinin argues: 
western-style education concurrently expanded the ranks of the effendiyya173 and 
provided a vocabulary for imagining Egypt as a political space comparable to 
European nation states. Thus empowered, the effendiyya presented themselves as 
bearers of a national mission and sought to forge new relations with both foreigners 
and lower-class Egyptians.174 
 
These Egyptian leaders pushed for education reforms, challenged foreign rule, and laid the 
foundation for the nationalist party’s success during the occupation.  
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 Simultaneously, Al-Azhar University in Cairo was undergoing significant reform. As 
a religious university, Al-Azhar was affected differently by educational missions. In fact, it 
was more influenced by the movement of scholars throughout the Middle East rather than 
Europe. Many of the intellectuals who studied at Al-Azhar were devoted to forming a 
nationalistic consciousness that coincided with Islamic teachings. The notable Al-Azhar 
scholar, Muhammad ‘Abduh, was committed to creating a create “a new type of ‘ulema175 
who could articulate and teach the real Islam and so provide the basis for a stable and 
progressive society, a ‘middle group’ between the traditional and revolutionary forces.”176 
Students of ‘Abduh went on to become nationalist leaders in their nations when under 
colonial rule. For example, in “Representing Copts and Muhammadans: Empire, Nation, and 
Community in Egypt and India, 1880-1917,” C.A. Baly explains: 
Indian students at the Al-Azhar seminary in Cairo, for instance, formed a network 
through which the ideas of Mahomed Abduh were brought into the same public 
arena as those of Syed Ahmed Khan and the Ali brothers, and other major reformers 
in India.177  
 
The networks Baly describes were imperative in constructing a nationalist ideology in 
Egypt and India when confronted with colonial rule. Amongst these scholars, ideas about 
imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism were discussed and shared. Thus, it can be 
suggested that the intellectual class throughout the Middle East and South Asia was much 
more connected than colonial officials perceived.  
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The dramatic rise of Egyptian nationalism in the years preceding the war has been 
attributed to the Lord Cromer’s system of rule and specifically his attitude toward 
education. His priorities were to restore financial stability to Egypt and avoid the unrest 
that manifested in India. Russell discloses that his experience in India taught him “that too 
much education makes for an unwieldly, critical populace.”178 She continues: 
thus, he revamped the educational system in Egypt by limiting access to education, 
increasing fees and the number of people paying them, changing the composition of 
the student body, and changing the curriculum within the schools.179  
 
Lord Cromer believed this would quell antagonistic feelings towards Britain. 180Yet Robert 
Tignor explains in Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 that his 
policies “had the effect of doing precisely what he wanted to avoid.”181 Lord Cromer’s harsh 
method of rule led to an Egyptian political crisis by the early twentieth century. According 
to Daly, “the political crisis of these years established the nationalist movement in Egypt; 
consequently, the British were compelled to rely on autocratic techniques more frequently 
to maintain their position.”182 For example, Tignor explains that Lord Cromer “isolated 
himself from the Egyptian population” and established “the image of superiority- both 
military and moral- of the British and by punishing all efforts to challenge this position.”183 
Consequently, British officials had a difficult time understanding the Egyptian population 
and were “unable to acquire accurate knowledge of the feelings of the Egyptian people.”184 
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At the same time, the educated class recognized the British officials disconnect from the 
Egyptian population and used it to strengthen their nationalist campaign. They challenged 
British policies and used their literacy to spread anti-British sentiments in the press. 
Educated Egyptians read articles to the illiterate class to ensure that their nationalist 
ideology spread to a wider range of the Egyptian population. Concurrently, in 1907 three 
political parties were established: the People’s Party, the Constitutional Reform Party, and 
the Nationalist Party.  While these three parties were initially confined to a small sector of 
society, they played a significant role in promoting nationalism among the Egyptian 
population. When the British declared a protectorate at the start of World War I, the stage 
was set for a mass nationalist uprising against the British.  
The 1919 revolution suggests that the British were naïve to underestimate the 
power of the student population or its connections to other sectors of society. Throughout 
British official documents, the British persistently separate the students of Al-Azhar from 
the rest of society. Official documents blame the Azharites (students of Al-Azhar) for 
disturbances during the protectorate period and label them as the leaders of the entire 
movement.  It is not until the 1919 revolution that the British recognize the broader 
students’ ability to rally the Egyptian nation through anti-British propaganda and 
demonstrations. It was beneficial to separate Al-Azhar students from government students 
because the British made it very clear that they were not involved with Al-Azhar.  When 
addressing problems in the government schools, British officials deflect the blame to 
students’ parents and argue that they are inherently disobedient. Similar to how the British 
presented the fellahin to be an isolated sector of society that supported the occupation, 
conversely, they portrayed Egyptian students as the only sector in opposition to the 
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occupation. They did this in order to validate their policies and to appear as though they 
had more support than they did. 
In the Special Mission to Egypt report, the Mission assesses the causes of recent and 
existing disorder amongst students preceding the 1919 revolution. The British needed to 
defend the work they did in government schools to justify and secure their occupation in 
their colonies. In the section of the report, “The Present Situation and its Difficulties,” the 
Mission states that “anti-British feeling is practically confined to the upper class and the 
intelligenzia” and “it has also gained a strong hold on Azhar, and Nationalism is now 
reinforced by Islamism.”185  Furthermore, they explain: 
There is no general hostility to the British among the fellahin or smaller landowners. 
Any manifestations of such hostility have been due to the influence of Nationalist 
emissaries from the towns, exploiting religious feeling or temporary grievance 
connected with the war. The most dangerous of these emissaries are the 
Azharites.186 
 
The Mission aims to clarify in the report that the Egyptian disturbances were confined to a 
small sector of society and hold the Azharites responsible for the unrest in Egypt in order 
to justify their rule. British divide and rule tactics are conspicuous in this statement, as the 
Mission attempts to explain Egyptian hostility by dividing society based on geographical 
region and class. Furthermore, students were constantly referred to as “agitators” and 
“extremists” in order to portray them to be inherently disobedient and radical.  They assert 
that nationalist leaders were “capable and dangerous” because of their radical religious 
views.187 British officials continuously made a clear distinction between religiously 
                                                      
185 NA/FO 848/19, 1. 
186 NA/FO 848/19, 1. 
187 NA/FO 141/521/6. 
  62 
educated Egyptians and government educated Egyptians to argue that this unrest was 
confined to a small and radical sector of society. 
This tactic is evident in British police commander, Russell Pasha’s autobiography. 
Russell Pasha describes that “in mentioning students it is necessary to differentiate 
between the students of the government schools and those of Azhar.”188 It was necessary 
and beneficial to make this distinction because the British needed to maintain that they 
were not responsible for Azharites behavior. He continues: 
the Azhar students were in those days a turbulent crowd, always ready to make 
disturbance on any excuse that could be counted a religious one. Though usually not 
mixing with the government school students, on this occasion they made common 
cause with them.189  
 
Russell Pasha’s statement insinuates that the Azharites relationship with government 
students was not a normal happenstance. It also suggests that he wants to depict their 
disturbances to be religiously motivated, so that the British could not be faulted. He 
proceeds to discuss the accumulation of events during the 1919 revolution and describes 
that “during those two days there were incidents all over the native quarters of the town, 
but the focus was the Azhar Mosque, which formed a most difficult problem.”190 It was 
convenient to deem Al-Azhar as the center of the disturbances because the scope of British 
authority had not extended into religious institutions. 
Furthermore, when describing Egyptians who studied in Europe, British officials 
degrade their education by ridiculing the thought that they could ever be equal to 
Europeans. Official documents insinuate that Egyptians were inherently inferior to all 
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Europeans to make the point that British control was necessary. Hooker concludes that the 
nationalist movement was a product of the evolution of education over the late nineteenth 
and twentieth century. He reports that “the leaders are men who style themselves as the 
intellectuals of Egypt, and are mostly men of legal training, many of them educated in 
Europe.”191 Hooker’s choice of language - "style themselves" -  to describe nationalist 
leaders undermines their intellectual ability in comparison to European intellectuals. He 
continues that “the outstanding leaders are men whose ambitions have been disappointed, 
men of intense vanity, and who, if given power, would be the first to misuse it.”192 
Considering the pressure from the League of Nation’s newly implemented mandate system, 
it was important that the British portrayed current Egyptian leaders to be incapable of 
independently governing. They explain that leaders, such as Saad Zaghlul, Ismail Sidki, and 
Mohamed Mahmoud, had stirred up agitation because they believed they should be valued 
the same as Europeans. He concludes that these men “deliberately set to work to stir up 
discontent with the existing order of things.”193 Hooker continuously notes their reckless 
misuse of power by describing detailed accounts of the demonstrations the nationalist 
leaders had apparently caused across Egypt to build the case that Egyptians needed British 
guidance.  
 On account of the central role students played in the 1919 revolution, it was crucial 
for the British officials to address and appear concerned about problems in the government 
school system. In the report, “The Present State of Education in Egyptian Government 
Schools” written by George Robb, a member of the Ministry of Education, he assesses the 
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education problem in government run schools after the 1919 revolution. He refers to 1919 
as the end of the “golden era” and depicts that trouble began in the schools “when all 
classes of students were taught to regard themselves as the soldiers of the national 
movement.”194 Robb attributes the shift in students’ attitudes to nationalist leaders such as 
Saad Zaghlul, who often referred to students as his army. British officials argue that 
nationalist leaders were able to captivate students’ attention when British officials 
disappeared from schools and were replaced by “men of an inferior caliber” during the 
protectorate period.195 Robb explains that this resulted in “the total destruction of that 
spirit of obedience which the British regime fostered.”196  Similar to how British official 
reports criticize the Omdeh for abusing power in the provinces during the war, Robb 
argues that nationalist leaders took advantage of students in the cities. The lack of British 
presence in government schools during the war resulted in a loss of confidence in British 
authority and consequently led to the 1919 student strikes. Robb recounts that teachers 
“incited the students to strike, and even drove away in many cases the few students who 
desired to study and avoid striking.”197 Furthermore, he continues, “it is also commonly 
asserted that the Wafdist extremists have paid agents in all the schools, ready at all times to 
create strikes and organize demonstrations.”198 The British attempt to defend their work in 
schools by claiming that inferior teachers forced students to strike. It was important to 
proclaim that the disturbances were fostered by a select group of Egyptians, rather than a 
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natural accumulation of unrest. Furthermore, Robb constantly highlighted the inadequacy 
of Egyptian teachers. He portrays the Egyptian teachers as self-interested and incapable of 
maintaining respect and obedience from their students to emphasize how necessary British 
presence was. 
 The religious curriculum in government schools became troublesome to the British 
when the nationalist movement gained support from Al-Azhar. British officials proclaimed 
that students in every Egyptian school were being fed nationalist propaganda by their 
religious teachers.199 Hooker explains that “no matter what schools the young Egyptians 
attend, their religious education is given by graduates of Al-Azhar.”200 It is important to 
note that many of the nationalist leaders had attended Al-Azhar, in addition to studying 
abroad in Europe. Upon his arrival in Egypt, Lord Allenby states that “Al-Azhar, the great 
Moslem religious college of Cairo, is the center of disaffection now; and owing to its 
sanctity, it is difficult and dangerous to deal with the agitation there preached and 
fostered.”201 For the British, grappling with the threat of Al-Azhar was complicated because 
of the university’s religious aspect. It was convenient to harp on this factor because the 
British were able to use the Muslim religion as a scapegoat.  Furthermore, Mr. R. A. Brown, 
a member of the Ministry of Education, describes the difficulties of religious education in 
government schools in his education report. He explains “it has been extremely difficult to 
know what is taught precisely on the Moslem side.” 202 Religion was the one part of the 
curriculum the British were incapable of curtailing, and consequently claimed they were 
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unable to determine the value of religious teaching in schools. Thus, it was easy for the 
British to blame unrest in government schools on religious teachers. British officials 
emphasize that “strikes were largely engineered by the teachers,” and, specifically, 
religious teachers posed a threat to maintaining order amongst students. Similar to how 
Robb condemns Egyptian teachers for stirring up agitation in government schools, British 
officials constantly separate religious students and government students to argue that the 
agitation is confined to religious educated Egyptians.  203    
British official documents also note other “evils” of the educational system, which 
they attribute to the growth of the movement. 204 The Mission affirms that when 
government schools were run by Egyptians, order and discipline did not exist.205 Following 
the 1919 revolution, Hooker considers the main grievance amongst students to be the lack 
of opportunities after graduation. Compared to the opportunities offered after graduation 
in Europe, Egyptian were restricted to civil service careers. He describes that these had “no 
charms for the educated youth of Egypt. Such callings entailed responsibility and hard 
work, both of which are avoided, when possible, by Egyptians.”206 Hooker condemns the 
educated youth by implying that they are unsatisfied with the opportunities offered in 
Egypt because of their work ethic. He does this to divert attention away from the fact that 
there were few opportunities for educated Egyptians. Ultimately, this led to the over-
crowding of popular professions, such as law. Hooker notes that “the law school has always 
been the center of all student demonstrations, and may be looked upon as the executive of 
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the malcontent lawyers in Egypt.”207 Given that the majority of the Egyptian educated class 
continued on to become lawyers, Hooker discredits their profession by describing them as 
“malcontent lawyers.” Even within the educated class, British officials consistently 
produced divisions as a strategy of domination. It was part of their strategy to divide the 
educated class into teachers, religious teachers, Al-Azhar graduates, and more, in order to 
explain the unrest amongst students in Egypt. 
In addition to understanding how students’ unrest accumulated in schools, their 
important role in the revolution forced the British to recognize the faults in the 
government school system.  For example, the Mission states: 
while the British occupation has conferred great material benefits on Egypt and has 
relieved the population from the grosser forms of oppression and injustice, it has 
not in any corresponding degree raised the general level of civilization prevailing 
among the vast majority or improved the conditions under which they live. This has 
been mainly due to the failure of the administration to establish any system of 
education which extends to the mass of the people.208 
 
At the time, it was important for Britain to appear concerned about the status of their 
colonies because of the international scrutiny they faced after the war. Yet, rather than hold 
the British Ministry of Education responsible for the lack educational reforms, the report 
explains that they “cannot be held responsible for the limitations of the resources at its 
disposal.”209  Once again, the British officials justified their position by blaming Egyptians 
for the failures of the education system. They also note that the Ministry of Education 
should not be in charge of managing schools but act as a “central guiding authority for 
education.”210 Furthermore, the report gathers that the most urgent need is to extend 
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national elementary education to the masses of Egyptians. This included making 
elementary education free, regulating building policies, reforming the examination system, 
and providing equal education in the cities and provinces.211 They conclude that if these 
reforms were adopted general civilization would improve. Yet, nonetheless, Khedive Ismail 
undertook these exact education reforms during his reign before the British occupied 
Egypt.212 Once again, the British conveniently ignore the fact that education reforms had 
progressed prior to their occupation.   
Overall, analysis of British official documents suggest that the British divided society 
to appear as though they had support from some groups of Egyptians. This was apparent in 
Hooker’s description of schools in the cities versus the provinces. He explains that “in 
England our great schools and universities are situated far away from the excitement and 
temptations of large towns.”213 While conversely, “when framing the educational system in 
Egypt, those responsible failed to foresee the result of allowing boys from the Provinces to 
come under the influence of a great city.”214  Hooker’s depiction shows that British officials 
wanted to portray the unrest amongst Egyptians to be confined to the cities to appear as 
though they had support from Egyptians in the provinces. It was part of their governing 
strategy to keep the provinces isolated from the cities. Hence, when this failed the British 
criticized the Egyptian’s for not imitating the British educational system. Furthermore, 
Hooker explains that “the young Egyptian, when sent to school, is deficient in many 
qualities which are characteristics of the European boy. Speaking broadly, there is no moral 
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training of the children in Egyptian homes, and parental discipline is generally lax.”215 As a 
result, these children are left in the care of “ignorant and fanatical servants, who instill 
hatred of the foreigner in their minds.”216 Hooker’s claims suggest that the British 
perceived the educated youth from the provinces to be more susceptible to nationalist 
propaganda because of the environment they grew up in. It implies that the British 
believed their lack of discipline at home made the Egyptians out of control and disobedient. 
Additionally, he makes a clear distinction between the educated youth in Europe and Egypt 
to affirm that the Europeans are naturally superior. Highlighting this distinction was 
beneficial to argue an Egyptian revolution was inevitable because Egyptians were 
inherently inferior to Europeans Therefore, in the perspective of the British, if Egyptians 
had the same moral fiber as Europeans. Disturbances and unrest throughout Egypt would 
have not taken place, and the British would not have had to step in – or to stay – to reform 
the country. 
Reports also emphasize the class divisions the current school system created in the 
provinces. In the Ministry of Education’s report, Brown claims that one of the biggest evils 
of the school system is that “a child who goes to school begins to despise his father and 
mother, who could neither read nor write.”217 To solve this problem, Brown advocates for 
combining primary and secondary education to increase the number of schools in the 
provinces so more Egyptians could obtain a primary degree.218 He explains that this would 
allow “boys to remain at home up till the age of at least ten years, and yet not be excluded 
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from the possibility of gaining a primary certificate.”219 This is an example of the British 
clearly isolating Egyptians in the provinces by narrowing education opportunities. Brown 
argues that if boys spent less time in the cities, they would grow up to be more fit for a 
career in agriculture. He explains that “by the old system of education, a class was being 
created entirely unfitted for agriculture, the mainspring of Egypt’s prosperity.”220 The 
educated youth would “go into towns” and “tend to become effendis (high status men) and 
never settle down to country life again.”221 Brown implies that the British were concerned 
with the division between educated youth and their parents because of the void it was 
creating in agricultural careers, with the corollary assumption that Egyptians are more fit 
for agricultural careers than they are for other ones. Furthermore, this British suggested 
that the present education system strengthened class divisions and produced a supposedly 
new generation of educated Egyptians in the provinces. Institutional policies that would 
keep boys in the provinces at home until age ten would reinforce the Egyptian class 
structure and keep them isolated from cities.  
It is also clear that the British  wanted to depict Egyptians as inferior by constantly 
highlighting the perceived moral deficiencies of students. The prevalence of Egyptian 
parents throughout education reports indicates that the British wanted to blame 
government students’ unrest on their home environments. The report explains that 
“Egyptian parents complain that the discipline and character of their children deteriorates 
in the schools,” while “the school authorities report that the evil begins at home.”222 It was 
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convenient for British officials to illustrate disobedient acts in government schools as 
distinctive Egyptian characteristics. Doing so took the responsibility off British officials 
shoulders and painted Egyptian students to be naturally disobedient. Thus, in regard to 
necessary reforms, the reports constantly assert that the only solution for this problem is 
to “provide that the education given should train the character as well as the intelligence of 
the new generation.”223 The British were confident they could bring back the Egyptian 
“spirit of obedience”224 by reforming the government school system to teach European 
moral values. 
Simultaneous with the events that occurred in Egypt, the British empire’s position in 
colonial nations under close examination by the League of Nations. As a result, the 1919 
revolution reflected poorly on their ability to govern Egypt. Considering the massive role 
Egyptian students played the revolution, it is not surprising that the British attempted to 
reform the government school curriculum to actually narrow educational opportunities. 
Keeping the educated class isolated from conspiring with other nations was vitally 
important to securing the empire. The British director of intelligence published a special 
report titled “Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in England and the Remedy” that 
investigates the accumulation of unrest in India and Egypt after the war. The report 
explains many cases of Egyptians and Indians societies in England conspiring with native 
Egyptian and Indian’s to stir up unrest in the colonies.  The report states: 
the purpose of this Report is to show that these two movements, if not actually 
directed by natives living in England draw their inspiration from such persons, and 
that the impunity with which Indians and Egyptians can hatch revolution at the 
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center of the Empire re-acts very unfavorably upon the loyalty of the Egyptians and 
Indians and may culminate in the commission of outrages in England itself.225  
 
British officials had to be aware of how the situation in the colonies correlated with 
domestic disturbances. It can be insinuated that the British believed unrest in India and 
Egypt did not naturally manifest but had been inspired by Indian and Egyptian 
communities in England. Therefore, it was in Britain’s best interest to keep the two groups 
separate by curtailing educational opportunities. British reforms kept natives illiterate, so 
they could not conspire with other colonies and nations.  
The Special Mission of Egypt reached the consensus that education reforms were 
imperative to restoring peace and order. The repetition and weight placed on Egyptian 
students in official documents published after the 1919 revolution revealed that the British 
recognized the educated class to be the biggest threat to their occupation. Members of the 
educated class proved to play an integral role in the revolution based on their ability to 
unify the Egyptian masses. Therefore, British official documents constantly divide the 
educated class based on status, occupation, geographic location to explain the unrest. They 
characterize the Egyptians’ behavior to be inherent in order to defend government schools 
from being held responsible for the disturbances. While the British wanted to appear 
concerned with the status of education in Egypt, the lack of adequate attention paid to the 
school system over the course of their occupation contradicted their claims in education 
reports. 
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Conclusion 
 The British occupation of Egypt has been a compelling topic for scholars due to the 
complexity of the British empire’s position in their colonies in the post-World-War I period. 
It can be concluded that international, domestic, and colonial pressure forced the British 
empire to be very careful about how they positioned themselves in these contexts. When 
the 1919 revolution occurred, the British had to strategically construct a narrative that 
would enhance their colonial image and downplay the Egyptian nation’s unity. The extent 
to which the fellahin, women, and students are repeatedly invoked in the sources suggests 
that their unity in the 1919 revolution forced the British to re-double efforts to divide the 
population in ways that would justify their continued presence in the country. 
As this thesis argues, in the case of the 1919 revolution, the British were not 
prepared for a full scale united movement because of a combination of ignorance and 
calculated strategy. The British perceived the nationalist movement to be confined to 
radical groups of religiously educated Egyptian men in the cities and thus were not 
prepared for a mass revolutionary movement backed by all sectors of society. The British 
assumed that Egyptians would not recognize the oppressive nature of their reforms and 
assent to increased colonial presence during World War I. The British relied on the 
imperial hierarchy and constantly professed that they were able to outsmart the Egyptians 
because they were naturally inferior. Not only did the success of the 1919 revolution reveal 
that the Egyptian nation was far less inept and backwards than British official documents 
professed, but it also challenged the British empire’s reputation on a grand international 
scale. Conclusively, the Egyptians were much more politically aware and internationally 
connected than the British perceived.  
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Upon completion of the Special Mission’s stay in Egypt, the Mission concluded that 
abolishing the protectorate and forming a treaty was the only way to restore civil 
obedience and peace in Egypt.226 At this point, the Mission recognized that British officials 
underestimated the power of the nationalist movement and relied too heavily on ruling 
tactics that were successful in other colonies to govern Egypt. Coming to agreement with 
nationalist leaders was the only way to protect Britain’s foreign interests in Egypt and 
maintain peace. The 1919 revolution marked a watershed in Egyptian history because of 
the movement’s ability to bring international attention to the situation in Egypt. The 
Egyptian nation’s unity and the movement’s mass scale impressed upon the British that 
they needed to find new ways to maintain their interests in Egypt. 
The British professed 1919 revolution to be a massive turning point for the 
Egyptians. Yet, as I have shown, it was the culmination of decades of nationalist and anti-
colonial activism across many sectors of the Egyptian population.  Moreover, the British 
reaction to the revolution was to continue to divide the population in the same ways they 
had before the revolution. While the revolution and the post-war international climate 
persuaded the British to adopt a new form of colonialism in Egypt, “empire by treaty,” in 
many ways it was still business as usual. The British continued to profess that there were 
irreconcilable divisions in Egyptian society based on an essential immaturity. The 
discourse following the revolution reveals continuity of British ruling tactics, not change.  
 
 
 
                                                      
226 NA/CAB 24/117/49, 22. 
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